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Organic unity definition literature

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Unity is a principle in art that refers to a set of compositional strategies used by an artist to make the parts of a painting or another work of art, it can also apply to an element or elements of a piece of work that could also contain
other forms of expression. But unity always expresses a shared commonality within a painting or sculpture or textile. The principles of art have been enumerated by different artists, and art critics in all sorts of way. Although often called something else, unity is one that appears as a constant in those lists, often as a polar
opposite to contrast or variety. Unity of color and shape is what the art theorist is getting at under the (relatively) synonymous labels of uniformity, coherence, harmony, and similarity, expressed as characteristics of the elements of color, shape, and texture. In addition, at a structural level, unity can be seen in the symmetry or repetition or
approximation of multiple shapes within a piece. Examples of structural unity include a quilt with four quarters or regions that repeat, or a Tibetan mandala that echoes in repeated shapes that are nested within one another. Unity can be thought of in terms of Gestalt psychology as a factor that arouses the mind by the redundancy of
information. Elements in a painting that would be considered examples of unity might be colors that are close to one another in terms of hue or chroma, or recurring shapes, or textures that mimic one another—think of a piece of clothing
that unites two types of corduroys. It is true that extreme unity makes a composition boring: a checkerboard is the ultimate in unity, and not particularly interesting visually. While often associated with beauty and harmony, unity can also be sinister, when it communicates static or stultifying social norms. Grant Wood's "American Gothic" is
definitely an example of the unity of the sinister kind: the repeated pattern of the pitchfork with the paned stained glass of the church behind the couple is a none-too-subtle message communicated by the unity of the form. Unity is a tool in the kit of the artist, and can be folded in as subtle color symmetries, or involving complementary
design elements. It can work to please the mind and tie together the disparate forms in a painting, whether abstract or realistic. Sources Also found in: Thesaurus, Medical, Legal, Idioms, Encyclopedia, Wikipedia. (in'ti-grāt')v. inte-grat-ed, inte-grat-ed, inte-grates v.tr.1. To make into a whole by bringing all parts together; unify: a report that
integrates the findings of previous studies. 2. a. To join with something else; unite: a music program that was integrated with the general curriculum. b. To make part of a larger unit: integrated the new procedures into the work routine. 3. a. To open (an institution, for example) to people of all races or ethnic groups without restriction;
desegregate.b. To admit (a racial or ethnic group) to equal membership in an institution or society.4. Mathematics a. To calculate the integration of (personality traits).v.intr. To become integrated or undergo integration.[From Middle English, intact, from Latin
integrātus, past participle of integrāre, to make whole, from integer, complete; see tag- in Indo-European roots.]American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fifth Edition. Copyright © 2016 by Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company. All rights reserved. ('Inti
greited) adj1. characterized by integration2. (Industrial Relations & HR Terms) denoting a works which combines various processes normally carried out at different locations: an integrated steelworks. 3. (Biology) biology denoting a virus the DNA of which is incorporated into the chromosomes of the host cellCollins English Dictionary –
Complete and Unabridged, 12th Edition 2014 © HarperCollins Publishers 1991, 1994, 1998, 2000, 2003, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2014 Adj.1.integrated - formed or united into a whole incorporated, merged, unifiedunited - characterized by unity; being or joined into a single entity; "presented a united front"2.integrated - formed
into a whole or introduced into another entity; "a more closely integrated economic and political system"- Dwight D. Eisenhower; "an integrated as available to all races or groups; "integrated schools" integrative - combining and coordinating diverse elements into a wholejoint - united or
combined; "a joint session of Congress"; "joint owners"united - characterized by unity; being or joined into a single entity; "presented a united front"segregated neighborhood"4.integrated - resembling a living organism in
organization or development; "society as an integrated whole" or ganic - being or relating to or derived from or having properties characteristic of living organic life"; "organic life"; "organic life"; "organic remains found in rock" as an integrated whole organic remains found in rock or derived from or having properties characteristic of living organic remains found in rock or derived from or having properties characteristic of living organic remains found in rock or derived from or having properties characteristic of living organic remains found in rock or derived from or having properties characteristic of living organic remains found in rock or derived from or having properties characteristic of living organic remains found in rock or derived from or having properties characteristic of living organic remains found in rock or derived from or having properties characteristic of living organic remains found in rock or derived from or having properties characteristic or derived from or hav
Thesaurus of the English Language - Complete and Unabridged 2nd Edition. 2002 © HarperCollins Publishers 1995, 2002 Collins Spanish Dictionary - Complete and Unabridged 8th Edition 2005 © William Collins Spanish Dictionary - Complete and Unabridged 8th Edition. 2003 © HarperCollins Publishers 1995, 2002 Collins Spanish Dictionary - Complete and Unabridged 8th Edition.
Electronic Resource. © HarperCollins Publishers 2005Collins German Dictionary – Complete and Unabridged 7th Edition 2005. © William Collins Sons & Co. Ltd. 1980 © HarperCollins Publishers 1995 Want to thank TFD for its existence?
Tell a friend about us, add a link to this page, or visit the webmaster's page for free fun content. Link to this page: Everything breaketh, everything breaketh, everything is integrated anew; eternally buildeth itself the same house of existence. Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) Ken Krieg, in a June 28 memorandum to all
Defense Acquisition Board members and Overarching Integrated Product Team leads, discussed his ongoing initiative to review and apply Lean/Six Sigma principles to the DAB process. First published Tue Jun 14, 2016 Understanding romantic aesthetics is not a simple undertaking for reasons that are internal to the nature of the subject
Distinguished scholars, such as Arthur Lovejoy, Northrop Frye and Isaiah Berlin, have remarked on the notorious challenges facing any attempt to define romanticism is "the scandal of literary history and criticism" (1960: 234). The main difficulty in studying the romantics, according to him, is
the lack of any "single real entity, or type of entity" that the concept "romanticism" designates. Lovejoy concluded, "the word 'romantic' has come to mean so many things that, by itself, it means nothing" (1960: 235). The more specific task of characterizing romantic aesthetics adds to these difficulties an air of paradox. Conventionally,
"aesthetics" refers to a theory concerning beauty and art or the branch of philosophy that studies these topics. However, many of the romantics rejected the identification of aesthetics with a circumscribed domain of human life that is separated from the practical and theoretical domains of life. The most characteristic romantic commitment
is to the idea that the character of art and beauty and of our engagement with them should shape all aspects of human life. Being fundamental to human existence, beauty and of our engagement with them should shape all aspects of human life. Being fundamental to human existence, beauty and of our engagement with them should be a central ingredient not only in a philosophical or artistic life, but also in the lives of ordinary men and women. Another challenge for any attempt to
characterize romantic aesthetics lies in the fact that most of the romantics were poets and artists whose views of art and beauty are, for the most part, to be found not in developed theoretical accounts, but in fragments, aphorisms and poems, which are often more elusive and suggestive than conclusive. Nevertheless, in spite of these
challenges the task of characterizing romantic aesthetics is neither impossible nor undesirable, as numerous thinkers responding to Lovejoy's radical skepticism have noted. While warning against a reductive definition of romanticism, Berlin, for example, still heralded the need for a general characterization: [Although] one does...have a
certain sympathy with Lovejoy's despair... [he is] in this instance mistaken. There was a romantic movement; it did have something which was central to it; it did create a great revolution in consciousness, and it is important to discover what it is. (1999: 20) Recent attempts to characterize romanticism and to stress its contemporary
relevance follow this path. Instead of overlooking the undeniable differences between the variety of romanticisms of different nations that Lovejoy had stressed, such studies attempt to characterize romanticism, not in terms of a single definition, a specific time, or a specific place, but in terms of "particular philosophical questions and
concerns" (Nassar 2014b: 10, n.9). This entry approaches the topic along similar lines in order to identify a cluster of related questions, concerns, themes, and in order to bring out what is "romantic" in them. In lieu of a chronological, geographical, national,
or figure-based organization, the following is structured thematically—it focuses on the central romantic commitment to the primacy (in the remaining sections). While the German, British and French romantics are all considered, the central
protagonists in the following are the German romanticisms, German romant
roughly between 1796 and 1801–02—the period that corresponds to the heyday of what is known as "Early Romanticism" [Frühromantik][1]—offers the most philosophical expression of romanticism since it is grounded primarily in the epistemological, metaphysical, ethical, and political concerns that the German romantics discerned in the
aftermath of Kant's philosophy.[2] The entry elaborates on these concerns and explains how they shed light on the romantics advocated
what may legitimately be called "the primacy of the aesthetic". In romanticism, the "aesthetic"—most broadly that which concerns beauty and art—is not just one aspect of human life or one branch of the humanistic studies. Rather, if the romantic ideal is to materialize, aesthetics should permeate and shape human life. Friedrich Schlegel
one of the leading figures in Early German Romanticism, put this idea in a few memorable phrases: "The Romantic imperative demands [that] all nature and science should be united" (CF: #115), and "life and society [should be made]
poetic" (AF: #16). Schlegel is not alone on this matter. Similar sentiments and slogans had been expressed just a little earlier in what is commonly regarded as the manifesto of German romanticism, The Oldest Programme: The idea that unites everyone [is] the idea of beauty...I am now convinced that the highest act of reason, by
encompassing all ideas, is an aesthetic act, and that truth and goodness are siblings only in beauty, (Hölderlin, in Bernstein 2003: 186).[3] The British romantics have taken up and developed this view that the aesthetic is the foundation of knowledge and the pursuit of truth. "Beauty is truth, truth beauty,'—that is all//Ye know on earth, and
all ye need to know", Keats famously declared in the Ode on a Grecian Urn ([1820] lines 49-50, PJK). And in the Preface to Coleridge and Wordsworth's Lyrical Ballads (1800), we read, "Poetry is the first and last of all knowledge—it is as immortal as the heart of man" (paragraph 20, in PWWW, I, p. 141). How is this core feature of
romantic aesthetics, the primacy of the aesthetic, to be explained? A textually grounded and philosophically viable way to approach the imperative requires that we model our epistemological, metaphysical, ethical, political, social and scientific pursuits according to the
form of the aesthetic comportment to the world, exemplified in poetry. On such an approach, rather than aiming to replace "real" life, science and philosophy with poetry, the romantics urge human beings to fashion their ordinary lives and to do science and philosophy according to the model provided by poetry. Philosophy, science and
everyday life need not be poetry, but poetic or poetry-like. Structurally, they should become similar. Why so? The main task of this entry is to offer an answer to this question and to show that the reasons for "poeticizing" life, science and philosophy are philosophy are philosophical. 2. Aesthetics and Reason 2.1 Enlightenment and Sturm und Drang For
over a century, romanticism has standardly been regarded as a reaction against the Enlightenment (e.g., Haym 1870). The primacy of aesthetics may seem to speak in favor of this story because, on this interpretation, the romantics replaced the Enlightenment's faith in the sovereignty of reason with a belief in the sovereignty of art and the
affective and imaginative capacities that are involved in aesthetic experience. On this traditional interpretation, romanticism is antirationalist or irrationalist. But, while the romantic pursuit of the primacy of aesthetics marks a break with the Enlightenment, regarding romantic aesthetics as antirational or irrational and as antagonistic to the
core Enlightenment values is unjustified for a host of reasons (cf. Beiser 2003, Engell 1981, Gregory 2005). First, the romantics' focus on and praise for rational and autonomous criticism is continuous with the Enlightenment's commitment to the value of rational criticism. Admiring Goetthold Ephraim Lessing's ideal of criticism and his
devotion to independent thinking, Friedrich Schlegel writes, "critique is the common pillar on which the entire edifice of knowledge and language rests" (Critique: 271). Rather than discontinuing the Enlightenment's call to submit every belief and every action to the authority of rational criticism, the romantics are responsible for continuing
"the age of criticism"—which is usually taken to characterize the eighteenth century—well into the nineteenth century. In that sense, they are the "children" of the Enlightenment. Second, many of the core features of romantic aesthetics in addition to criticism—like the relation between beauty, truth and goodness, the pursuit of unity among
variety and the significance of the imagination and the sublime—would have been impossible independently of key Enlightenment thinkers. Third, the romantic elevation of aesthetic feeling and the creative imagination did not come at the price of their faith in and respect for reason. Even Friedrich Schlegel, who is often considered to be
the most enthusiastically inclined romantic, opened his Lectures on Transcendental Philosophy by arguing that philosophy is "a striving towards a knowledge...of the whole person" (ITP: 241). In one of his fragments, he commanded: "Never tire of cultivating the intellect until you will have finally found what is original and essential" (Ideas
#124). And yet in another fragment, he claimed that one of the two centers of genuine philosophy is "the rule of reason" (Ideas: #117). Such proclamations challenge another standard interpretation of romanticism, one that takes it to be a direct
outgrowth of Sturm und Drang, a counter-Enlightenment movement that flourished in the 1760s and 1770s. Briefly, this response to the Enlightenment, expressed in works of literature, theatre, music and the plastic arts, heralded individual subjectivity and the free expression of unconstrained feelings as the proper replacements for the
values of the Enlightenment. No doubt, the romantics shared with this movement the belief in a call "back to feeling". But regarding romantic texts. In his review of Friedrich Jacobi, one of the main sources of influence on Sturm und Drang, Schlegel declared,
"Only when striving toward truth and knowledge can a spirit be called a philosophical spirit" (Review of Jacobi's Woldamer, KA II: 71–2). In the same review, Schlegel harshly criticized what is known as Jacobi's salto mortale or "leap of faith": this is Jacobi's view that the only way to salvage our ethical and religious beliefs, in the face of the
limitations of the Enlightenment, is to renounce reason in favor of mere sensation and faith. In contrast to Jacobi, the German romantics never attempted to replace reason with faith, sensation, unconstrained feeling or intuition. Instead, they wished to bring out the rationality of the passions and the passionate nature of reason as part of a
unified and balanced picture of human life. Rather than a straight development of Sturm und Drang, then, romanticism is better understood as an attempt to synthesize reason and sensibility. Similarly, the British and
French romantics did not mean to dismiss reason and replace it with passion and imagination, but strived after "a conjunction of reason and passion" (Wordsworth was not imagination and feeling alone, but the union of deep feeling
with profound thought; the fine balance of truth in observing with the imaginative faculty in modifying the objects observed. (Coleridge, BL: Ch. 4) The romantics, then, sought to supplement but not 
production. They extended Kant's renowned view of concepts and intuitions, suggesting that reason without feeling is empty and feeling without the latter they would lose their humanity: We cannot deny the drive to free ourselves, to ennoble
ourselves, to progress into the infinite. That would be animalistic. But we can also not deny the drive to be determined, to be receptive; that would not be human. (Hölderlin, Hyperion, HSA 3:194) For the romantics, our receptive and spontaneous capacities could only be abstracted in thought, but not separated in reality: "Action and
passion are inseparable as north and south" (Novalis, FS: #317). Human dignity is grounded in rational and normatively constrained receptivity just as much as it is grounded in spontaneity. The restless striving after activity, the highest criterion of judgment, does not exclude all the virtues of receptivity but can only exist with them. (F.
Schlegel, KA 12: 130) Rather than dismissing the role and the significance of reason as such, the romantics challenged merely certain uses of reason, the laying down of absolute foundations, and system-building. And in a Kantian manner, they were concerned to expose the limits of reason and
constrain its uses to legitimate boundaries. But even the romantic exposure of limits is, as it were, "aesthetic". "Aesthetic" or "literary". "Romantic Poetry" is one such device and "Irony" is
another. 2.2 Romantic Poetry and Romantic Irony "Romantic Irony "Romantic Poetry" is a notion that Friedrich Schlegel coined and described in most detail in Athenaeum Fragments (AF) number 116. Rather than a particular genre or kind of poetry, Romantic Poetry as such insofar as "all poetry is or should be romantic" (Schlegel, AF: #116).
Romantic Poetry brings out the limits of reason in virtue of being reflective, "[hovering] on the wings of poetic reflection, and [capable of raising] that reflection again to a higher power" (AF: #116). Rather than being merely the "portrayed" object itself—a poetic representation—it "hover[s] at the midpoint between the portrayed
and the portrayer" (AF: #116), and so, like Kant's transcendental philosophy, reflects on the conditions of its own possibility and of human mindedness itself. It is not surprising, then, that Romantic Poetry is called "transcendental" poetry and a poetry of poetry" (AF: #238). Goethe's Wilhelm Meister, a romantic favorite, manifests
this dual reflective and substantive nature: It was so much the poet's intentions to set up a comprehensive theory of art or rather to represent one in living examples and aspects....This might suggest that the novel is as much an historical philosophy of art as a true work of art, and that everything which the poet so lovingly presents as his
true aim and end is ultimately only means. But that is not so: it is all poetry, high, pure poetry. (F. Schlegel, WM: 274) The transcendental nature of romantic poetry as such. Romantic Poetry is poetry as much as it is a
philosophical method and a vital approach to human life. It is a creative and reflective human power, manifested in the theoretical practical and aesthetic aspects of life; transcendental poetry...really embraces all transcendental poetry....really embraces all transcendental poetry...
#41) Romantic poetry is not alone in exposing the conditions of finite existence, but accompanied by an ironic way of living. Irony is a mode of self-restriction, whose "value and dignity" as a crucial dimension of human life, must be recognized (F. Schlegel, CF: #28). Irony is the balance between "self-creation and self-destruction" (CF:
#28), which means that irony is creative—it is constructive of its own perspective on the world. But at the same time, it is also "destructive" of the pretensions implicit in any perspective—the pretention to be holistic. Irony thus presents its perspective as restricted—as only one among many different perspectives on the unconditioned
whole. Accordingly, what romantic iron insists on through its restricting function is (a) the conceptual inaccessibility of the "Absolute" (explained in §3), and (b) what is known as "perspectivism"—the view that human beings are capable only of finite and limited perspective on the universe as a whole. Being ironic is a way of consciously
and intentionally bringing out the fragmentary nature of the human situation as lacking a "view from nowhere". Like Romantic Poetry, irony is not merely a literary or even a rhetorical device. Nor is it a purely theoretical method. Rather, in a Socratic spirit, romantic irony is a way of life. For it is, after all, for the artist as well as the man, the
first and the last, the most necessary and the highest duty...most necessary because wherever one does not restrict oneself, one is restricted by the world; and that makes one a slave. (CF: #37) Everyone, then, not only the writer, should be ironic. For, as exposing our finitude, irony is not only another romantic analogue of Kant's
transcendental method—the antidote to reason's natural but spurious tendency to transcend its limits—but also an existential condition of humility (On irony see also CF: #26, #48, 108; AF: 51, 121; and On Incomprehensibility). The romantic use of irony was sharply criticized, most famously by Hegel, as free floating form of
subjectivity. But not only does this criticism fail to do justice to the romantic insistence that irony itself is a form of self-constraint, but also to the imperative: "Don't exaggerate self-restriction" (F. Schlegel, CF: #37). This demand to constrain and regulate self-restriction itself is of equal importance to the demand to practice irony. Rather than
a free floating form of subjectivity, then, romantic irony is a constrained, and normatively governed form of life, meant to expose the limits of reason and facilitate a life of humility (cf. Rush 2006: 187). Romantic irony is a commitment to the form of life that is governed by the acknowledgement of finitude; a "transcendentally-Socratic" life of
humility. Accordingly, rather than an irrational or an anti-Enlightenment stance, romantic aesthetics is marked by a respect for and devotion to reason and rationality "within their bounds". Even a cursory glance through the writings of the romantics assures the reader that their interest in art and aesthetics is closely tied to their
epistemological and metaphysical concerns. The primacy that the romantics attributed to aesthetics is explained by (but is not reduced to) the roles that art and beauty may play in the pursuits of epistemic and metaphysical goals. One such goal concerns what the German romantics, and following them, Coleridge, called the "Absolute"
[das Absolute]. Briefly, this is how this explanation goes: in the aftermath of Kant's philosophy, the romantics were concerned with the Absolute, understood as the unconditioned totality of all conditions. Like Kant, they believed that such an unconditioned totality is inaccessible to discursive reason and is, to that extent, unknowable to
human beings. But reason's natural drive towards this "Absolute" is nonetheless significant and valuable (§3.1). In aesthetics they found a mode of life that best approximates (even if never reaches or grasps) the Absolute, insofar as the aesthetic approach to artworks (a) includes indeterminate affective aspect (§3.2), (b) involves a sui
generis normativity, constituting its own norms in attunement with the artwork it faces (§3.3), (c) is particularly suited to approach individual unities (§3.4), and (d) is open-ended (§3.5). 3.1 The Absolute Most broadly, by the "Absolute", the romantics refer to the unconditioned totality of all conditions. While the absolute itself is conditioned
by nothing, it conditions all the finite physical and mental manifestations of the world. Inspired by Kant's discussion of omnitudo realitatis—"All of Reality"—and by Spinoza's all encompasses everything else, physical and mental: "Only the whole is
absolute" (Novalis, AB: #454); "The universe is the absolute subject, or the totality of all predicates" (AB: #633). Metaphysically, every finite thing is merely one manifestation of an unconditional totality: only a single perspective on the whole. It is thus ultimately finite but also infinite, as part and parcel of the infinite whole. This notion of the
Absolute is not distinctively romantic. The German Idealists, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, were also concerned with related conceptions of the Absolute is distinctively different from the idealistic one. And it is the distinctive romantic treatment of the Absolute that explains much in romantic
aesthetics: While the idealists took the Absolute to be transparent to the human mind, conceptually representable, and inferentially related to other items of knowledge, the romantics regarded it as (1) ungraspable by concepts (i.e., as "non-discursive") and (2) as non-foundational. Following Kant, the romantics believed that all knowledge
is discursive: knowing requires conceptualization. But since concepts condition everything that might be known by determining it to be one way or another according to the forms of discursive thought, the Absolute, by its very definition as unconditioned, cannot be known. Knowledge [Erkennen] already denotes conditioned knowledge. The
unknowability of the absolute is, therefore, an identical triviality. (F. Schlegel, KA 18: 511, #64) The romantics further argued that the attempt to ground the whole edifice of knowledge in the Absolute—familiar to them from Fichte's project, which they both admired and harshly criticized—is futile. Like Kant, they believed that reason's
natural and necessary drive to proceed towards the unconditioned can never be fully realized. The unconditioned totality of experience is "a regulative idea" (Novalis, FS: #472): it cannot serve as a systematic grounding of experience is "a regulative idea" (Novalis, FS: #472): it cannot serve as a systematic grounding of experience is "a regulative idea" (Novalis, FS: #472): it cannot serve as a systematic grounding of experience is "a regulative idea" (Novalis, FS: #472): it cannot serve as a systematic grounding of experience is "a regulative idea" (Novalis, FS: #472): it cannot serve as a systematic grounding of experience is "a regulative idea" (Novalis, FS: #472): it cannot serve as a systematic grounding of experience is "a regulative idea" (Novalis, FS: #472): it cannot serve as a systematic grounding of experience is "a regulative idea" (Novalis, FS: #472): it cannot serve as a systematic grounding of experience is "a regulative idea" (Novalis, FS: #472): it cannot serve as a systematic grounding of experience is "a regulative idea" (Novalis, FS: #472): it cannot serve as a systematic grounding of experience is "a regulative idea" (Novalis, FS: #472): it cannot serve as a systematic grounding of experience is "a regulative idea" (Novalis, FS: #472): it cannot serve as a systematic grounding of experience is "a regulative idea" (Novalis, FS: #472): it cannot serve idea in the properties of the propertie
[conditioned] things [Dinge]. (Blüthenstaub, NS 2: 413, #1) Skeptical as they were about the discursive accessibility of the Absolute and about its capacity to ground all knowledge, the romantics never questioned either its existence or the worth of (open-endedly) striving after it: Neither our knowledge nor our action can ever attain the point
at which.... All is one; the determinate line can be united with the indeterminate only through an infinite approximation [in unendlicher Annäherung] (Hölderlin, "Hyperion", HSA 3: 326). Therefore, philosophy, whose first theorem is "All is One and One is All" (F. Schlegel, ITP: 244), must be "a striving" (ITP: 244). Even though philosophy
cannot systematically deduce all knowledge from the Absolute, it must nonetheless pursue its approximation. But if not through concepts, how can one approximate the Absolute? This is where aesthetics comes into the picture. Although scholars of romanticism disagree about the exact nature of the romantic approximation of the
Absolute, [4] they widely agree that it includes a variety of feelings associated with the aesthetic, like aesthetic pleasure, poetic feeling, "longing for the infinite [Sehnsucht nach dem Unendlichen]" and that it depends on the deployment of critical notions like "romantic poetry", wit, irony, allegory, myth and the creative imagination:
If we abstract from all knowledge and will...we still find something more, that is feeling and striving. We want to see if we will perhaps find something here that is analogous to the consciousness of the infinite.... (F. Schlegel, ITP: 244–45). Poetry elevates each single thing through a particular combination with the rest of the whole, [by
allowing] the individual [to] live in the whole and the whole in the individual. (Novalis, Poësie, NS 2: 533, #31). The romantics believed that there is something "which is not I, nor comes from the I, and which is also not merely a Non-1" (F. Schlegel, Thoughts, KA
18: #83). Baudelaire summarizes these romantic sentiments, declaring, The one who says romanticism says modern art—which is to say intimacy, spirituality, color, aspiration towards the infinite—expressed by all the resources of art. (Salon of 1846 [1981]) What is it about the aesthetic engagement with art and beauty that is particularly
suitable for approximating the Absolute? The rest of this section will develop a few possible answers to this question. 3.2 Aesthetic Feeling In the introduction to the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant writes that the feeling of pleasure in general, and aesthetic pleasure in particular, is the only representation that can never "become an
element of cognition at all" (AK 5: 189). One might think that feelings are thus placed outside of rationality. But this would be a mistake. On Kant's picture, aesthetic feeling is rational insofar as it is grounded in a universal mental state that underlies our capacity to judge in general (the free play of the imagination and the understanding)
and insofar as it is, through this mental state, responsive to the claims that beautiful objects make on everyone's satisfaction (AK 5: 282). Rationality, then, is irreducible to cognition both in the Kantian framework and in its romantic inheritance. Aesthetic feeling is rational because of its ground and responsiveness to a claim, but non-
cognitive insofar as it cannot be subsumed under concepts. Feeling does not determine any concrete property that its object has independently of subject and an object. Aesthetic pleasure, particularly, is a non-determining mode of reflecting on the relation,
not between a particular subject and a particular object, but between subjectivity and objectivity and objectivity as such. This rational but non-cognitive nature of feeling, in general, and of aesthetic feeling, in particular, is perhaps the central feature that renders aesthetic feeling an attractive ingredient in addressing the epistemic and metaphysical
concerns that occupied the romantics. For while all cognition is determination through concepts, Kant's aesthetics suggests a mode of reflective awareness that is not determining, but yet a way of being aware of and responsive to aspects of the world. This is exactly what the romantics have been looking for—a non-discursive, but rational
and normatively governed mode of awareness. And they found it in poetry, regarding it as grounded in feeling: Not art and artworks make the artist, but feeling and inspiration and impulse. (F. Schlegel, CF: #63) Poetry is passion. (Wordsworth, "Note to the Thorn" in LB: 136) All good poetry [originates in] the spontaneous overflow of
powerful feelings. (Wordsworth, Preface to Lyrical Ballads (1800), paragraph 26, in LB) If, then, feelings and passions are constitutive of art, and if aesthetic or poetic feeling is a key ingredient in the pursuit of the Absolute, then philosophy should become poetic and "poetry and philosophy should be made unified" (F. Schlegel, CF: #115)
We are now in a position to appreciate that this romantic imperative is explained partly by the view that philosophy cannot be reduced to concepts and propositions, but must also include certain kinds of affective mental states. To paraphrase Wittgenstein, discursive reasoning comes to an end. 3.3 Sui-Generis Normativity The non-
determining character of aesthetic feeling is related to the distinctive kind of normativity that characterizes artistic production and aesthetic appreciation. An expression borrowed from Kant is fitting here: on the romantic picture, both artistic production and aesthetic appreciation are "lawful without a law". Both are the source of their own
normativity, without being subject to any external law. Given that, they are appropriate for approximation must be non-determining (applying no conditions), but normatively governed rather than arbitrary. Following Kant's account of the genius, the romantics developed an understanding of the
artist as, on the one hand, original and imaginative (rather than submitting to any law of nature or principle borrowed from the tradition of art), and, on the other hand, receptive to nature: "Every good poem must be wholly intentional and wholly instinctive" (F. Schlegel, CF: #23). This combination of being independent of given rules and
attuned to something other than yourself is required not only for the genius, but also for approximating the Absolute. And it is this requirement that explains "the categorical imperative of genius[:] You should demand genius from everyone is to approximate the Absolute, then everyone should model
herself after the genius. Criticism consists of a related combination of features. While it is based on no prior rules, it is also open and receptive to the work it concerns. And it is through the engagement with the work it concerns. And it is through the engagement with the work that each critical judgment constitutes its own norms. Although we can and should legitimize our judgments of beauty and
art, we cannot do so by appeal to any given concepts or norms that are external to the work at stake. The artwork, on this picture, is sui generis—it provides its own law and end unto itself" (F. Schlegel, CF: #65). The critic should seek to express the work
in a way that is faithful to its individual nature and be responsive to the specific norms that it constitutes: To judge [Goethe's Wilhelm Meister] according to an idea of genre drawn from custom and belief, accidental experiences and arbitrary demands is as if a child tried to clutch the stars and the moon in his hand and pack them in his
satchel.... Fortunately, [the novel] turns out to be one of those books, which carries its own judgment within it. (F. Schlegel, WM: 275) That means that beauty makes demands on us, demands on us, demands that, according to the romantics, are analogous to the demands that other persons make on us. Beautiful objects make a claim on us to respond to
them as the specific individuals that they are, on their own terms: "See your statues, your paintings, your friends as they are" (Diderot, Salon of 1767). Hence, the romantic declaration, "one cannot really speak of poetry except in the language of poetry" (F. Schlegel, DP). This lawfulness without a law fits the requirements of the Absolute.
For, if we adopt this structure of normativity and expression in our pursuit of the Absolute, we may approach it in a normatively governed and committed way, without determining and thus conditioning it according to any given law, principle, or concept. Here, then, is another reason why philosophy should become poetic, and the true
philosopher, not merely a "half critic" (as the romantics alleged against Kant), but a complete critic: philosophy should be open and attuned to the Absolute without trying to subsume it under any principle of reason, just as criticism is open and attuned to each work without subsuming it under any external law.[5] 3.4 Concrete Individuality
Like Spinoza's God and Kant's omnitudo realitatis (All of Reality), the Absolute is an all-encompassing individual whole—a totality, the parts of which could be understood only negatively, as its limitations. To approximate the Absolute, then, we need a
mode of consciousness that is particularly suited to discern a holistic unity in an individual. While §5.3 discusses what is required in order to apprehend holistic unities, and the holistic unities, and the holistic unities, and the holistic unities of artworks and natural beauties. On the romantic picture, an
artwork that does not present itself as a "living individual" (Novalis, Poësie, NS 2: 534, #35) is not worthy of the title of a work of art, and the one who does not approach artworks as unique individuals has a feeling for them" (F. Schlegel, AF: #415)
The aesthetic approach to beauty, then, is an approach to those things that are irreducibly individuals, those that should not be approached merely as ones of many—as instances of general kinds—but as concrete individuals: "Everything that is to be criticized must be an individual" (F. Schlegel, FLP: #634). And this is the very approach
that is required in the pursuit of the Absolute given its individual nature. 3.5 Open-Endedness Kant attributes to aesthetic pleasure: a causality in itself, namely that of maintaining the state of the representation of the mind and the occupation of the cognitive powers without a further aim. We linger over the consideration of the beautiful
because this consideration strengthens and reproduces itself. (AK 5: 222) Aesthetic feeling is open-ended and future-oriented. In contrast to practical pleasures (the "pleasure in the agreeable") that need to bring forth an action or an object in order to maintain themselves,
aesthetic pleasure is self-maintaining. This is partly because aesthetically enjoying an object involves a commitment to remain faithful to the beauty of that object, beauty that calls for and deserves an open-ended affective pursuit. The romantics welcomed this structure of aesthetic feeling as particularly suitable for the pursuit of the
Absolute. Since the Absolute can never be determined, the stance that approximates it must itself be open-endedly. Since the romantics take philosophy to be a tendency "towards the Absolute" (Schlegel, ITP: 242), philosophy itself should be reconceived. The
systematic search after first principles is not only hopeless, but also unfortunate. It can only slight the significance of the Absolute by the effort to determine it through principles. Instead, philosophy should be aesthetically shaped, as an open-ended pursuit: If knowledge of the infinite is itself infinite, therefore always only incomplete,
imperfect, then philosophy as a science can never be completed closed and perfect, it can always only strive for these high goals, and try all possible ways to come closer and closer to them. (Schlegel, Lectures on Transcendental Philosophy, KA 12: 166) 4. Aesthetics, Ethics and Politics The intersection between romantic aesthetics,
ethics and politics offers a particularly clear challenge to the standard view of the romantics as anti-Enlightenment, such as autonomy or self-
determination and the ideal of Bildung. Art and aesthetics also provided a model for the romantic political ideal: a democratic, egalitarian community arounded in the republican values of liberty, equality and fraternity. In addition to proving the anti-Enlightenment interpretation of the romantics false, tracing these romantic notions of
autonomy, Bildung and political community also offers a challenge to another well-known interpretation, we find the romantics exploring and emphasizing the importance of aesthetics for ethical and political concerns. Shelley, for example, wrote in a letter to
a friend: "I consider Poetry subordinate to moral & political science" (Shelley, LS 2: 71). In his famous Defence of Poetry (1821), he proclaimed, "Poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the world" (SPP). Rather than "aestheticizing" politics, then, the romantics found in art and aesthetics resources for solving ethical and political
problems. Yet, a central difficulty facing any interpretation of romantic ethics and politics lies in the change that this view has undergone during the later years of many a romantic: the strong democratic and egalitarian views of the likes of Friedrich Schlegel and Friedrich Schleiermacher gave way to a growing conservatism and religiosity
after 1800. The first generation of British romantics likewise turned from their conviction that to be young during the revolution was, as Wordsworth said, "bliss" and "heaven", to an acknowledgement of the challenges awaiting a genuine political reform. With this shift in mind, they turned from political optimism to religion. A unified account
of romantic politics is thus untenable. Instead, the section will focus on the political views of the German romantics during their early and middle phases This is because the ideals developed during these phases, though different from some of the later
ideals, can shed light on the romantic path towards conservatism later on (Beiser 1992). §4.5 will briefly present the romantics' later political thought, 4.1 Autonomy "Freedom is the only reality in wishing, willing, sensing and striving", writes F. Schlegel (TPL II: 155). While the absolute reality of freedom might not admit of a proof, according
to many of the romantics, human beings should nonetheless approximate freedom by developing autonomy—self-determination and self-legislation. Autonomy is the right of the individual to think for herself and act rationally and freely (TPL II: 155). The work of art and aesthetic judgment were seen as paradigmatic expressions of
autonomy and, as such, as splendid models for the cultivation of individual human autonomy. For (as discussed in §3.3) neither the creation and judgment of art are not lawless, but normatively governed by the laws generated autonomously by each
individual work and by each individual aesthetic judgment. Poetry is a "law unto itself". This characteristic of the production and judgment of art should not only be incorporated into the way every person is to govern herself—as the source of her own rational laws rather than as subject to external laws, and as self-determining rather than
passively determined—but also serve as a model for the way in which every person should be respected and treated. Aesthetics provides us with a paradigm for following two central ethical demands—the demand to govern oneself autonomously and the demand to respect everyone else as autonomous. These two duties, then, constitute
another explanation of the "categorical imperative of the genius" previously mentioned—the demand that every person be a genius. For if every individual is to be autonomous, she should fashion herself after the model of the artist. 4.2 Bildung Bildung is another characteristic romantic value that each individual should develop in herself.
While literally meaning "formation", Bildung is best understood as a mode of ethical and cultural cultivation, or self-realization that allows the individual to mature into independence and responsibility. "Concerning Bildung, we speak not of external culture, but the development of independence" (F. Schlegel, TPL II: 148). Bildung is a
particularly modern value, formed at least in part as a challenge to what the romantics regarded as the rift between sensibility and reason in modern life. To achieve Bildung, each individual has to constitute herself as a unified whole that coordinates a balance between sensibility and reason: "The end of humanity is...to achieve harmony
in knowing, doing and enjoying" (F. Schlegel, On the Study of Greek Poetry, in KA I, 627). The artwork is a good model for such an ideal insofar as it is, according to the romantics, an organic and harmonious whole of diverse and even conflicting parts: Poetry...must be a harmonious mood of our mind...where everything finds its proper
aspect.... Everything in a truly poetic book seems so natural—and yet so marvelous. We think it could not be otherwise...and we feel the infinite...sensations of a plurality in agreement. (Novalis, Last Fragments: #3) This is why "Every human being who is cultivated and who cultivated himself", namely, the person who achieves Bildung.
"contains a novel within himself" (F. Schlegel, AF: #78). Aesthetic judgment is also a harmony of reason and sensibility. On this issue too, the romantics were inspired by Kant's aesthetic judgment is also a harmony of reason and sensibility. On this issue too, the romantics were inspired by Kant's aesthetic judgment on this issue too, the romantics were inspired by Kant's aesthetic judgment is also a harmony of reason and sensibility.
ourselves and one another aesthetically, then, is approaching it with a harmony of "knowing, doing, and enjoying". And achieving this harmony constitutes a genuine moral being: a balanced rational, sensible and affective person. For that reason, it is not surprising to find Coleridge, the critic, aiming to establish "the close and reciprocal
connections of Just Taste with pure Morality" (Lecture I, CLL). Romantic Bildung was a political ideal as much as it was an ethical one. It was needed, not only for the sake of independent individual responsibility, but also for the possibility of a genuine non-revolutionary republic: There is no greater need of the age than the need for a
spiritual counterweight to the Revolution and to the despotism which the Revolution exercises over people.... Where can we seek and find such a counterweight? The answer isn't hard: unquestionably in ourselves...the center of humanity lies there. (F. Schlegel, Ideas: #41) The French revolution had shown the romantics both the value of
a republic based on liberty, equality and fraternity, but also the dangers of anarchism and strife that revolutionary act, but through proper education. Art does not only offer a model for a harmonious, cultivated soul, but is also the best medium through
which to achieve the moral education that leads to this harmony and, on its basis, to the best republic. Attending to art (as well as producing it) is a form of self-cultivation because the spirit of art allows human beings to transcend baseness (a particular danger given modern instrumentalism and materialism), and to develop their humanity.
As we now turn to see, the romantics regarded art also as a particularly effective medium for uniting people, no matter their differences, and so took it to be a great spur for united, social and political action. 4.3 Individuality and Sociality The allegiance to autonomy and to the value of Bildung may seem to indicate individualism. And it does,
to an extent. While individuality is indeed a romantic value, anti-communal individualism is not. The romantics never celebrated uncurbed individuality and universality...constitutes the first condition for moral well-being" (F.
Schlegel, OP: 427). Without doubt, the romantics criticized Kant's categorical imperative as proposing a problematically universalist ethics as problematic because they regarded individual expression and the development of a unique,
characteristic and unified self as intrinsically and morally valuable. Yet, the romantics were also critical of extreme individualism, such as the one they found promoted by some Enlightenment thinkers. In other words, they challenged those individualists who criticized any form of social and communal participation as potentially a form of
passive submission to external authority. In response to these two extremes of universalism and radical individualism, the romantic sought after a golden mean—romantic ethics strived to preserve and strengthen social bonds and encouraged a pluralistic communal life while supporting rational criticism, autonomy, individual rights,
liberties and freedom of expression: "Does not the universal gain from the individual, the individual from universal relations?" (Novalis, Faith and Love: #5). The romantics believed that individualism is not merely compatible with sociality and communitarianism, but that it actually depends on genuine forms of the latter: "The vocation of man
is attainable only through human society" (F. Schlegel, TPL II: 144). Autonomy and Bildung, in particular, though nothing other than individual freedom and self-realization, can never be divorced from the social: Autonomy should be universal and not relate to the individual but the whole, for otherwise it would destroy itself.... We cannot
consider human beings individually. (TPL II: 156) On the romantic picture, the achievement of free, fully-formed individuality is impossible independently of strong sociality and vice versa. An ideal of sociality is deficient if it leaves no freedom for the distinct expression and liberties of each individual, and the individual is most herself, as an
individual only insofar as she freely interacts with others: "A person can be a person only among people" (TPL II: 145). Rather than contradictory impulses, as they are often regarded today, sociality and individuality, on the romantic picture, are not only compatible but also naturally harmonious—grounded in human nature: [6] No man is
merely man, but...at the same time he can and should be genuinely and truly all mankind. Therefore, man, in reaching out time and again beyond himself to seek and find the complement of his innermost being in the depths of another, is certain to return to himself. (F. Schlegel, DP: 54) It is this romantic view of natural human sociability—
rather than some exaggerated zeal or effusiveness—that explains and is explained by the centrality of love in romanticism. In contrast to many a modern thinker, the romantics regarded love rather than self-interest as a basic condition of human nature ("Love is...the core of ourselves" (F. Schlegel, TPL II: 151)), and as the proper basis for
a genuine sociable but pluralistic community: Yes, love, you power of attraction of the spiritual world! No individual life or development is possible without you. Without love, and without the development of one's individuality
there is no perfection in love. When one complements the other, both grow together inseparably. I feel united within me the two fundamental conditions of ethical life! (Schleiermacher, "Monologue II", 180). But as natural as it may be, the romantics believed that love has suffered paralysis in modernity. On their view, the rise of capitalism
and instrumentalism had suppressed natural social bonds and encouraged self-interest. The consequent view of human beings as solely quantitatively distinct further leveled them and inhibited their distinctive and unique expressions. How could people balance individuality and sociality in the face of modernity? Here too romantic poetry
and the creative imagination come to the rescue. Poetry is not only based in love, but is itself a form of love insofar as it bonds different individuals: Poetry befriends and binds with unseverable ties the hearts of all those who love it. Even though in their own lives they may pursue the most diverse ends, may feel contempt for what the other
holds most sacred, may fail to appreciate or communicate with one another, and remain in all other realms strangers forever; in poetry through a higher magic power, they are united and at peace. (F. Schlegel, DP: 53) The poet is, quintessentially, "a social being" (F. Schlegel, DP: 55) insofar as he both expresses, "in lasting works the
expression of his unique poetry" (DP: 55) and reaches to others and reciprocally communicates with them. The poet integrates: his part with those who have found theirs from a different side, in a different way. Love needs a
responding love. Indeed, for the true poet's communication...can be beneficial and instructive. (DP: 55) Following the "categorical imperative of the genius" is required, then, also for achieving Bildung and autonomous individuality in and through society: it is an ethical and social demand as well. 4.4 Political Community While sociality and
communal spirit are ethically required for the achievement of autonomy and Bildung, community was also a romantic political ideal. Such an ideal required that what the romantics viewed as modern alienation—estrangement of the self from others—be challenged in three ways: by promoting love (as discussed above), developing a sphere
of free social interaction and pursuing a holistic, social unity. The ideal political community must facilitate a sphere of social life, which is free and independent of political control because free sociality and conversation, the ends of this sphere, are both valuable in themselves and the best alternative for external laws. The romantics believed
that social bonds should not be upheld by laws that are imposed on individual citizens from outside, but by the love encouraged by a common culture and free interaction. Romantic poetry is an exemplary model for achieving such a free domain since it is "a republican speech...in which all the parts are free citizens and have the right to
vote" (Schlegel, CF: #65). Aesthetics is at the center of this political vision also because the political ends of free sociability and conversation are the very same ones that the romantics practiced in their intellectual-artistic salons and in their communal, cooperative aesthetic projects. The political community should allow for creative and
artistic endeavors such as the Athenaeum journal, which was the mouthpiece of the German romantics at the end of the eighteenth century and a journal that was independent of the control of the publishing establishment. It was written in collaboration (mainly by the Schlegel brothers, Novalis, and Schleiermacher), and aimed at rational
criticism and Bildung. Such aesthetic projects are a model for the politician. This is because "sympoetry" and "sympoetry" and "sympoetry" and be an integral part of political life: Perhaps a whole new epoch of science and art would be inaugurated were
symphilosophy and sympoetry to become so common and deeply felt that there would be nothing odd were several people of mutually complementary natures to create works in community must also be characterized by a specific kind of relation between the political
body as a whole and its members: the state should be an organic or holistic whole, which means most broadly that the state as a whole must be prior to its parts since, as we saw, it is necessary for individual identity and self-realization. Additionally, the romantic community as a
whole is prior to the individual citizens (i.e., its parts), insofar as genuine social bonds and a well-functioning political entity cannot be "constructed" out of separate self-sufficient and self-interested individuals (as the modern social contract theory has it). To properly function and achieve the ethical aim of sociality, the links between the
political members should be organic: the members should not be connected to one another by an externally imposed social contract, but by natural love, affection and attraction. Unsurprisingly, it is through poetry that the familial-like bonds, required for the ideal state, should be developed over and above the unit of the biological family.
"Within the family, minds become organically one, and for this reason, the family is total poetry" (F. Schlegel, Ideas; #152). While the state as a whole should not be imposed on its citizens from outside, but be self-determined, Individual autonomy should be supported by
promoting the direct and active participation of all individuals in the political process. The organic unity of the state, then, implies reciprocity: the parts are dependent on and is posterior to its parts. The work of art provides, once
again, the structural model for this political ideal by virtue of its organic unity, where "every whole can be a part and every part really a whole" (Schlegel, CF: #14). When genuine, art is characterized exactly by the kind of holistic, organic, but egalitarian and pluralistic unity that must characterize the ideal community: Many works that are
praised for the beauty of their coherence have less unity than a motley heap of ideas simply animated by the ghost of a spirit and aiming at a single purpose. What really holds the latter together is that free and equal fellowship in which, so the wise man assures us, the citizens of the perfect state will live at some future date; it's that
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priesthood that proclaims the inner mea	aning of all spiritual secrets and spe	eaks from the kingdom of God. (Schleiermach	ner, On Religion [translation modified]). It is for t	these reasons that "at the time of the rep	oublic, the artists will not be a special class" (I	F. Schlegel, PF: #749). In such an ideal repu	blic everyone must be an artist who, by
			Statements such as Blake's claim, "Princesar				
		, , ,	by their reaction to the terror of the French revo elopment, the romantics believed that the repub	,		· //	,
			stocratic and monarchic at the same time: to le				
AF: #214) Rather than opposed to the o	original romantic ideal, this late viev	v is a natural outgrowth of the earlier ideal sir	nce it does not only maintain the early republica	nism, but also continues, through modifi	ication, the early romantic emphasis on Bildu	ng as a necessary condition for a proper repu	ublic. Since even during this later period, the
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			as a threat from modern science. The threat wa s it brings out a different conception of nature a				
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	•	·	and parcel of, nature (§5.3). 5.1 The Worry We	•	,	· • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	
			face to Hyperion, HSA 3: 326). Hölderlin expres				
	,,,		e, whose wings are dull realities", was regarded nce "dissected [nature] atomistically like a dead	1 \ \	, 0	,	•
			ring sense of man's alienation from his natural s				
•	• •	•	nces of this approach to nature are multiple. Fir	, , , ,		' ' '	,
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	•		er above the Mist" (1818). In the epistemological claims to knowledge (human experience)? Or	1 7	1		•
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science was also seen as posing a chal	llenge to any attempt at a secular a	alternative to religion. Seen as fully accessible	e to the calculative part of the human mind, nati	ure becomes transparent and devoid of a	any mystery or human-transcending power. A	re we left without a source of wonder, awe o	r reverence in our modern world? According
	•	•	uctive not only in terms of its object—nature—b	0,	1 , ,	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
			works as a "knife in hand" (Wordsworth, The Pr and counterbalance the merely calculative, quar				
63 / /	O, 11		n lie/beyond the reach of human will or power;/		·	•	, ,
	•	• •	antic science—is, in essence, poetic. It is roma	1 3, .	,	11 0 7 07 0	
•	•	•	study, nature: Anyone who finds in infinite natur	•		,	
			Igment in the third Critique, and Schelling's On ealism and Spinoza's realistic monism (2003: 1				
			rther, and in Spinoza, one who recognized the				
3 7/	1 2	3 , ,	om human beings only in degree, not in kind. N	1 3	1 2	1 3 ,	I I
1 ' 1	\ J'	, , ,	between the philosophical outlooks of Fichte ar ural world. But this is only the metaphysical pre		, t		<i>"</i>
		• · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	ed fully to develop in the third Critique since he	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	,	
			pinoza's words "modes" of nature, namely, me				
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			imposed on them from outside by their products—not only self-conscious philosophers, creat				
,		0 /	nat strives to work according to one and the sai	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	•	•	,
Literature, 1796") 5.3 Art's Nature, Natur	ıre's Art Beauty in nature and art is	a key for this organic and dynamic conception	on of nature for multiple reasons. First, the holis	tic and unifying character of poetry is su	itable not only for the reformed scientific met	nodology that fuses together reason, imagina	tion and feeling, but also for unraveling
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	0,	, ,	inger), and (2) their parts are recognized as who		` '	1	1 (' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' '
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		,	called a formal unity. In organic life, the reciproc			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
·	·	•	neir beauty. While, for example, a painting migh ther than their existence, that depends on the b		1 0 1	7 1 7	, ,
			lse of this work [Wilhelm Meister], so organized	, ,	,		, , ,
			in terms of its holistic unity, but also in terms of				
			nere artifact, but a quasi-organism in the sense ch wants to become a work of art. (F. Schlegel,				
, ,		0, 1	as a whole. It inspires and quides us in seeing	,			•
governed activity: That which reminds u	us of nature and thus stimulates a fe	eeling for the infinite abundance of life is bea	utiful. Nature is organic, and therefore, the high	est beauty is forever vegetative; and the	e same is true for morality and love. (F. Schle	gel, Ideas: #86) While this view is to be found	I in the third Critique, the romantics went a
			rather than regulative principles for approaching				
J .	, <u> </u>	1 '	transforms itself into a human being" (Heinrich at doctrine which in the study of nature directs	0 , ,,	, , ,	, ,	,
	, ,		romantic "scientific revolution" for yet another r		•	·	
awe (see Stone 2005). While bringing o	out nature's organic structure is dec	cisive for rebutting modern alienation, enchan	tment is required primarily for challenging two	other consequences of modern science:	the threat of a detached and unresponsive tre	eatment of nature and what the romantics re	garded as a threat of secularization. Not
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	, , , , , , , , ,	37 3 11	e limits of our knowledge, and thus to what mus		11 7	, , , ,	,
			ced by the romantics in their account of "romant				
			power to make the most familiar new, refreshing should also strive to elevate them by throw[ing]				
. ,	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		cal Ballads.) Wordsworth calls on poets to write		, , , , , , , , ,	, .	
"incorporated with the beautiful and peri	manent forms of Nature" (ibid.). An	d it is through this process of romanticizing th	nat nature appears again as great and awe-insp	oiring, "The great Nature that exists in wo	ords/Of might Poets" (Wordsworth, The Prelu	de (1805), Book V, lines 618–19). Second, ro	omantic poetry is essentially ironic insofar
			e basis for a way of life that is centered on hum				
			n's description of nature is possibly the most por a spirit, that impels, All thinking things, all object				
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			n LB) Through the romantic lens, then, nature b	3 '			
let confused words come out; Man walk	s through these forests of symbols	Which observe him with a familiar gaze. (La	Nature est un temple où de vivants piliers Lais	sent parfois sortir de confuses paroles L	'homme y passe à travers des forêts de syml	ools Qui l'observent avec des regards familie	rs) (Baudelaire, Correspondences, 1861
,	O' 1	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	ature as we love other human beings: Oh, mos	•	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	1 ,	, , ,
		• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	8–1829], Fragmentary Remains, 14) As eccent n contemporary environmental philosophy and p	•	• • • •	-	•
•	•	•	sm (see Abrams 1971, Frye 1968, Cavell 1979)	. ,	,		,
			precursor of the fundamental outlook of postmoo				
			n and language, historicism and hermeneutics, , no reality There is, despite all the senses, r				
	<u> </u>		of the senses, it is need to point beyond itself" (Bowie 2003: 53),	•	,	•	
lines in romanticism—skepticism about	foundationalist philosophy and sys	stem-building, the emphasis on human creation	on, language, and the role of historicism and he	rmeneutics—are indeed related to certa	in strands in postmodernism. But reading ron	nantic aesthetics as proto-postmodernist is lir	nited for a host of reasons. First, the
S S	•		kepticism of absolute principles and philosophic		, , , ,	,	
,	• •		not be reduced to any given, prior rules, they a triving after unity and wholeness. Art was not m		, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	,	• •
supreme, for it opens to him the holiest	of holies, where that which is sepa	rated in nature and history, and which can ne	ever be united either in life and action or in thou	ght, burns as though in a single flame in	n eternal and primordial unity. (Schelling, Syst	em of Transcendental Philosophy, 1800, in F	leath 1978: 231) Third, the romantics'
	` ,	, ,	or such a desire is anathema to most post-mod		. , ,		
_	•	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	 this interpretation does not force itself on us seantic aesthetics. On this formal account, rather 			• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	
			reasons. Arguably, romantic aesthetics is not o				
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	•	· ·	999: xiii). Its tremendous impact on generations	, , ,	, , ,	, ,	pegins and when it ends. Indeed, rather
ınan a post-romantıc age, our age may	be yet another phase in the age of	romanticism: Romanticismis the first majo	r phase in an imaginative revolution which has	carried on until our own day, and has by	riio means completed itself yet. (Frye 1968: 1	es, see also, Larmore 1996)	

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